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ABSTRACT
Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements
between sel¯sh autonomous agents. In this paper we fo-
cus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-
mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach
where a seller agent negotiates over multiple interdependent
attributes with many buyer agents in a bilateral fashion.
In this setting, \fairness," which corresponds to the notion
of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business
constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such
as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many
bargaining strategies for the seller agent, which take into
account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple at-
tributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of
the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation,
especially for the case of impatient buyers. Several of the
developed strategies are able to extract almost all the sur-
plus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many,
even though bargaining is bilateral.
1. INTRODUCTION
From a business perspective electronic markets have the
potential danger of becoming increasingly more transpar-
ent with low search cost, strong price competition, and low
margins. Automated negotiation enables a business to go
beyond price competition. Through the use of autonomous
agents, which negotiate on behalf of their owners, a busi-
ness can obtain °exibility in prices and goods, distinguish
between groups of buyers based on their preferences, and
even personalize complex goods according to the demands
of individual buyers without signi¯cantly increasing trans-
action costs.
It is common to characterize negotiations by their setting:
bilateral, one-to-many, or many-to-many. We focus on the
one-to-many bargaining setting in this paper, where a seller
agent negotiates, on behalf of a seller, with many buyers
individually in a bilateral fashion. In this paper we develop
various strategies for this setting which enable a seller agent
to bargain over multiple interdependent issues simultane-
ously and e®ectively.
In many cases, auctions can be used to e®ectively organize
one-to-many bargaining. Depending on the setting, auc-
tions can provide buyers with the incentive to reveal their
preferences truthfully, and to allocate the goods e±ciently.
For various situations, however, auctions may not be the
preferred protocol for bargainers. In situations of, for ex-
ample, virtually unlimited supply, multiple issues, and/or
continuous sale the appropriate auction protocol becomes,
at best, much more complex. Consequently, businesses may
opt for the intuitive and °exible bilateral bargaining proto-
col, where the seller agent negotiates bilaterally with one
or more buyers simultaneously by exchanging o®ers and
counter o®ers.
In many electronic commerce domains the supply is °exi-
ble and new goods can be reproduced quickly, at relatively
low costs. This is especially the case for information goods,
where the reproduction costs are almost zero, but it may also
be the case in other retail markets. With virtually unlim-
ited supply, there is no direct competition between buyers.
In that case, auctions such as the standard Vickrey auction
fail to provide su±cient pro¯t for the seller (cf., for exam-
ple, [1] for a possible solution). Secondly, bargaining can
also naturally include more complex goods, where not just
the price is negotiated, but many other issues as well, such
as service, quantity, quality, and warranty. Especially with
a relative large number of issues (cf. [9]) and °exible supply
a myriad of bargaining outcomes are possible; consequently,
even with many buyers, bargaining is really bilateral. With
many buyers, a seller may however still utilize the one-to-
many setting to determine and adjust the utility level of an
o®er. Thirdly, bargaining can be easily applied in case of
continuous sales. Auctions usually end or even start at a
¯xed point in time.
1 Using bargaining, new buyers can en-
1The double auction used in certain ¯nancial markets with
many-to-many negotiation is an example of a continuouster the negotiation at any given time, and buyers can obtain
the good at any time by accepting a seller's counter o®er.
Potentially, bargaining can lead to unsatis¯ed customers if
buyers perceive the outcomes of the negotiations as unfair.
This can occur when, for instance, two customers obtain
similar goods at the same time but end up paying very di®er-
ent amounts. Fairness of negotiation outcomes is important
for customer satisfaction, which in turn may be important
for a business' long term pro¯tability. The seller agent can
prevent unfair outcomes by incorporating a fairness norm,
comparable to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions [8],
whereby customers are treated in a similar fashion. This
fairness aspect emphasizes that bargaining is really one-to-
many.
For the case of virtually unlimited supply, as for informa-
tion goods, we present a number of one-to-many bargaining
strategies for the seller in this paper, which take into account
the fairness constraint and bargain over multiple attributes.
We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies
using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of
impatient buyers. One set of strategies, the so-called \re-
sponsive threshold" strategies, are able to extract almost all
the surplus, given su±cient time pressure. These strategies
bene¯t from the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even
though bargaining occurs in a bilateral fashion. In addition,
the strategies are able to ¯nd win-win agreements (i.e., very
little Pareto improvement is possible).
A number of related papers study bargaining using an evo-
lutionary approach, e.g. [7, 6, 11, 3]. Our approach extends
previous research to multiple (types of) buyers and bilateral
negotiation strategies for one-to-many multi-issue bargain-
ing which can bene¯t from time pressure.
In addition a growing body of literature exists on multi-issue
negotiation, which focus on developing techniques a seller
and/or a buyer can use to determine the relative magnitude
of the various issues and consequently search for approxi-
mately win-win (or Pareto-e±cient) deals [9, 5, 4, 10, 13].
Although we also consider the problem of how to determine
the values for the various attributes of an o®er, the focus of
the paper lies on the development of \threshold" strategies
for one-to-many negotiation. These strategies determine the
desired utility level of a deal and can be used in conjunction
with the techniques already developed in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we describe the bargaining setting and introduce
strategies for one-to-many bargaining. In Section 3 we dis-
cuss the simulation environment used for testing the perfor-
mance of the strategies. We present the simulation results
of the conducted computer experiments in Section 4. Con-
clusions follow in Section 5.
2. ONE­TO­MANY BARGAINING
2.1 Fairness
An agent representing a business can be endowed with var-
ious bargaining strategies. The bargaining outcome should,
auction; these markets are however characterized by limited
supply.
however, be fair. Because fairness must be ensured by the
seller and because buyer preferences are private, we de¯ne
fairness as follows. Suppose at time td a buyer reaches a
deal. We say that this deal is fair, relative to a ¯xed in-
terval ¢ > 0, whenever there exist a start time ts, with
td 2 [ts;ts + ¢], such that the seller is indi®erent between
any other deal reached within the interval [ts;ts+¢]. When-
ever price is the only issue, a buyer does not strictly prefer
any deal for which the seller is indi®erent. In this case, we
can give the following equivalent de¯nition: a deal is fair,
relative to a ¯xed interval ¢ > 0, whenever there exist a
start time ts, with td 2 [ts;ts+¢], such that the buyer does
not strictly prefer any other deal which is reached within
the interval [ts;ts +¢]. Note, that this de¯nition of fairness
is closely related to the notion of envy-free auctions in [8];
it adapts the notion of envy-freeness to the more continuous
setting of bilateral bargaining.
2.2 Bargaining Protocol
The seller agent negotiates with many buyer agents simul-
taneously in a bilateral fashion by alternating o®ers and
counter o®ers. An o®er speci¯es a value for each attribute
of the negotiation, such as the price, quality, quantity, and
other relevant aspects. The protocol allows for multiple
o®ers to be submitted simultaneously. Exchanging multi-
ple o®ers can improve the (Pareto) e±ciency of agreements
made when several attributes are concerned. An o®er con-
stitutes a Pareto improvement over another o®er whenever
it makes one bargainer better o® without making the other
worse o®. A bargainer proposing multiple o®ers can be indif-
ferent between those o®ers whereas his opponent may prefer
a particular o®er and can improve e±ciency by selecting this
o®er.
We call the set of o®ers combined with the preconditions
a proposal. A bargainer can accept one of the submitted
o®ers or reject all o®ers and place a counter proposal. Ne-
gotiations between a buyer and seller agent proceed to the
next round whenever a proposal is submitted and terminates
when one of the submitted o®ers is accepted or after a prede-
¯ned period of time has elapsed. Note that a bargainer can
introduce a delay before submitting a counter proposal. The
duration of a round varies depending on the delay. Figure 1
depicts the alternating o®er bargaining protocol.
Responder = Buyer or Seller Initiator = Seller or Buyer
1:propose(Offers, Precondition)
2:abort−bargaining
2:accept−proposal(Offer, Condition)
2:propose(Offers, Precondition)
3:accept−proposal(Offer, Condition)
3:abort−bargaining
3:propose(Offers, Precondition)
Figure 1: The agents' bargaining protocol
2.3 Time Pressure
An important assumption is that buyers are impatient and
prefer an early agreement. Time pressure or time impa-tience is a common assumption in bargaining, e.g. [12]. The
seller agent is simultaneously and continuously negotiating
with many buyers and is therefore less concerned with im-
mediately reaching an agreement for a particular bargaining
outcome, i.e., he is relatively patient. We model this relative
time patience by assuming that the seller, unlike the buyers,
has no time pressure.
At least in theory, the seller can bene¯t from buyers' time-
pressure by introducing a delay before submitting a counter
proposal. An important question is then which bargaining
strategies can most e®ectively utilize these potential bene-
¯ts. Experimental results discussed in Section 4 show that
responsive threshold strategies, which we will discuss in the
next Section, are very e®ective: depending on the time pres-
sure, they are capable of extracting very large shares of the
seller surplus. (Reasoned from the seller's perspective the
surplus is just the maximum utility he can realize by selling
the goods or services.)
2.4 One­to­Many Bargaining Strategies
The challenge is to develop bargaining strategies for the
seller agent that maximize overall revenue by utilizing dif-
ferences in buyers' willingness to pay without violating the
fairness constraint. Instead, these strategies utilize di®er-
ences indirectly through buyers' time pressure. In order to
bene¯t from time pressure, a strategy speci¯es, in addition
to an actual (counter) proposal or an acceptance proposal,
when to respond to an opponent's proposal.
The seller strategies as developed determine the o®ers of a
proposal in two steps. First, they specify a threshold level
which sets the utility level of the o®ers. Second, they gener-
ate the values for the individual attributes, given the thresh-
old. Advanced techniques for multi-issue negotiation, as for
instance discussed in [9, 5, 4, 10, 13], can be applied to the
latter. The focus of this paper is on e®ective strategies for
determining the threshold, and we therefore only consider
the relatively simple technique of randomly determining the
attribute-values given a threshold. The probability with
which a value of an attribute is determined may however
depend on a buyer's corresponding o®er (see below).
Besides specifying the utility of a (counter) proposal, the
threshold is also used to determine when to respond to an
outstanding proposal. More precisely, a seller strategy re-
sponds with a ¯xed delay to all outstanding proposals which
lie below the (current) threshold value; a proposal lies be-
low the threshold value whenever the seller's utility for all
o®ers in the proposal lies below the threshold value. While
applying a delay to all proposals below the threshold value,
the seller agent continues to negotiate with the remaining
buyers by immediately responding with a counter proposal.
This negotiation without delay with the select group of buy-
ers can, in principle, continue for several rounds. During
these rounds the threshold is not adjusted. The goal at
this time is to improve the Pareto-e±ciency of the ¯nal
agreement by ¯nding mutually bene¯cial trade o®s between
the various attributes. In the simulation the seller agent
only makes a single proposal to improve the e±ciency of the
deal. For a particular proposal of a buyer the seller strat-
egy randomly generates o®ers within the neighborhood of
the buyer's best o®ers, i.e., with the highest utility for the
seller. This already su±ces for very e±cient outcomes. If
a buyer does not accept one of the seller agent's o®ers, the
seller agent will again respond with a delay.
Another aspect that needs to be considered by the seller
agent is the fairness of the agreements. Fairness prescribes
that the seller should be indi®erent between the deals made
within the de¯ned time interval. Whenever the seller agent
almost simultaneously accepts two di®erent o®ers a bargain-
ing outcome may be unfair. The seller strategy ensures fair-
ness by always making a (interesting) counter proposal, in-
stead of accepting an o®er directly.
The seller agent can be equipped with a number of strategies
for determining the threshold, which we introduce below.
2.4.1 Fixed & Time­Dependent Threshold Strategies
For purpose of comparison we introduce a ¯xed threshold
strategy. Clearly, the ¯xed threshold strategy is not capable
of utilizing buyers' time pressure. The purpose of the strat-
egy is to provide some insights in the minimal extractable
pro¯t, given strategic behavior of the buyers.
The second strategy we consider is a time-dependent thresh-
old strategy: the current utility or threshold depends on
time. The threshold only changes from one period to
the next. Unlike the ¯xed-threshold strategy the time-
dependent strategy is capable of utilizing buyers' time pres-
sure. Its success, however, depends on how much it knows
about buyers' preferences, or how easily more about buyers'
preferences can be learned, in relation to time-based pricing
strategies.
2.4.2 Responsive Threshold Strategies
The ¯xed and time-dependent threshold strategies do not
adjust the threshold based on the buyers' o®ers. Inspired by
the ¯rst-price auction, we introduce another type of bargain-
ing strategy with a responsive threshold. With this strategy,
all o®ers submitted by the buyers within a certain ¯xed time
interval are collected after the previous o®ers made by the
seller agent. Then it determines the current highest utility,
which is equal to the utility of the best o®er from the col-
lection of o®ers. The threshold is set to the current highest
utility.
The success of the responsive threshold strategy does not
depend on some (a priori) knowledge of buyer preferences,
unlike the ¯xed and time-dependent strategies. Intuitively,
buyers who| due to time pressure| su®er more from delay
are inclined to bargain less \hard-headed" than other buy-
ers. Consequently, these buyers may reach a deal sooner and
pay a higher price. Thus, at least potentially, the strategy is
capable of utilizing buyers' time pressure without requiring
(a priori) knowledge of buyer preferences. Unlike auctions,
actual bargaining occurs in an alternating exchange of o®ers
and counter o®ers, typically initiated by a buyer. Parties
bargain over the price and other relevant aspects of the pro-
vided good or service. Even though the seller agent's strat-
egy can be auction-inspired, buyers will be unaware of this
fact. They do not know the opponent's bargaining strategy
on forehand; they perceive the bargaining process as bilat-
eral. Buyers may of course suspect some relationship withother ongoing negotiations. The point is that unlike a true
auction the relationship with other simultaneously submit-
ted o®ers is not speci¯ed up front, through a set of rules.
Reservation Value A drawback of the responsive thresh-
old strategy is that it becomes vulnerable whenever groups
of buyers experience very little time pressure. Without time
pressure buyers have no incentive to buy soon. They may
all independently decide to initially submit very low o®ers;
consequently utility will be very low for the seller. To cir-
cumvent this we also consider responsive threshold strategies
with a reservation value. A seller agent is never willing to
sell below the reservation value. This means we alter the
earlier de¯nition of the current highest utility. It now be-
comes the maximum of the reservation value and the best
o®er from the o®ers collected within a certain time interval.
An interesting advantages of introducing a reservation value
occurs when some but not all buyers experience very little
time-pressure. The responsive threshold strategy can then
still utilize the time-pressure of the other buyers.
We consider two approaches for determining the reservation
value. Either the reservation value is ¯xed, like the ¯xed-
threshold strategy, or it is time dependent, like the time-
dependent threshold strategy. Thus the responsive thresh-
old strategy with a reservation value is actually a combina-
tion of the responsive threshold strategy (without reserva-
tion value) and either the ¯xed or time-dependent strate-
gies.
3. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
We apply a simulation environment in order to evaluate the
performance and robustness of the above negotiation strate-
gies against many learning buyers. The agents in the simu-
lation are assumed to be boundedly rational: they can learn
and adapt their strategies by a process of trial and error, and
they do not know the seller's strategy. The bargaining pro-
cess is repeated many times, enabling buyers and the seller
to learn from past interactions. An evolutionary algorithm
is used to model the learning aspect of the agents. This is
a common approach within the ¯eld of agent-based compu-
tational economics (ACE) [14]. A number of related papers
study bargaining using an evolutionary approach, e.g. [7, 6,
11, 3]. Our approach extends previous research to multi-
ple (types of) buyers and bilateral negotiation strategies for
one-to-many multi-issue bargaining which can bene¯t from
time pressure.
3.1 The Bargaining Game
The seller agent negotiates with many buyer agents simulta-
neously by alternating o®ers and counter o®ers as described
in Section 2.2, where the buyer agents initiate the nego-
tiations. For our simulations we set a maximum number
of n discrete periods, where n is set su±ciently large such
that it has no signi¯cant impact on the results. For the
analysis we assume that o®ers consist of two interdependent
attributes, e.g. the price and the quality. We note that
buyer agents in the simulation do not leave the negotiations
or enter later. We also assume that, since buyers are im-
patient, buyer agents in the simulation will respond to the
seller agent's counter o®ers without delay. This is modeled
by having the buyer's counter proposal or acceptance pro-
posal occur in the same period as the seller's proposal.
3.2 Buyers and their Agents
Buyers are interested in buying at most one good in each
bargaining game. They can have di®erent preferences re-
garding the time pressure and attribute value combinations,
which together constitute the buyer type. For the analysis
we assume a ¯nite number of k types. Although k is ¯xed,
the number of participating buyer agents of each type varies
randomly for each negotiation game and is determined in-
dependently by a Poisson distribution with average m.
To illustrate the feasibility of our approach for interdepen-
dent attributes, we use the well-known Cobb-Douglas utility
function to represent a player's preferences for the two at-
tributes. More speci¯cally, the utility ui for buyer type i in
case of a disagreement equals zero and in case of an agree-
ment ui is de¯ned as
ui = (v1;i ¡ o1)
®i(v2;i ¡ o2)
¯i±
t
i;
where ®i and ¯i are parameters that indicate the relative
importance of the attributes, o1 and o2 are the negotiated
values the seller receives for the attributes (and the buyer
has to give in), and v1;i and v2;i represent the maximum
buyer i's is willing to give in on the individual attributes.
For example, let attribute 1 and 2 refer to price and quality.
Then o1 represents the price and o2 the di®erence between
the maximum quality and the actual quality of the good
received; v1;i then represents the maximum price buyer i is
willing to pay and v2;i the maximum buyer i is willing to
give in on the quality. Furthermore, ±i is the discount factor
used to model the time pressure, and t is the negotiation
time. In the simulation depreciation occurs at discrete time
intervals. Therefore, ±i is the discrete representation of time
pressure and t indicates the period in which an agreement
is reached. Note that discount factors are commonly used
for modeling time pressure, e.g. in the Rubinstein-Stº ahl
alternating-o®ers model [12].
3.2.1 Buyer Agent's Strategy
The buyer agents in the simulation apply time-dependent
strategies similar to the seller's time-dependent threshold
strategy described in Section 2.4. The buyer agent uses a
strategy similar to the random strategy of the seller (see
Section 2.4) to determine the values of the attributes, given
the threshold. The time-dependent strategy consists of a
piece-wise linear function to determine the threshold. The
parameters that determine the function are adaptive: using
an evolutionary algorithm they evolve such that the perfor-
mance of the strategy increases.
We also applied an extended strategy in our experiments by
using two separate piece-wise linear functions: one produces
the threshold for determining the utility level of the o®ers
and the other function determines the threshold for accept-
ing or rejecting the seller's o®ers. The separation of the two
functions enhances the bargaining capabilities of the buyer
agent. Results using the two representations are very simi-
lar. The outcomes presented in this paper are based on the
extended strategy.
3.3 Seller Agent
The seller agent bargains with a number of buyers simultane-
ously, without knowing the type of these buyers. The sellerselection
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Figure 2: The EA cycle for negotiations with two
buyer types and an adaptive seller
agent's utility in case of an agreement equals us = o
®s
1 o
¯s
2 ,
and is zero in case of a disagreement (recall from Section 2.3
that we can assume that the seller has no time pressure).
The total utility equals the sum of utilities obtained over all
buyers. Production costs are set to zero.
We consider ¯ve strategies for the seller agent: ¯xed thresh-
old, time-based threshold, responsive threshold and two
combined strategies (see also Section 2.4). The time-based
threshold strategy is similar to the strategy used by the
buyer. The ¯rst two strategies and the combined strategies
have parameters which determine respectively the threshold
value and the reservation value during a bargaining game.
These parameters are adaptive: optimal values are learned
using an evolutionary algorithm, explained below. The re-
sponsive threshold strategy does not have any parameters
that need to be learned.
3.4 The Evolutionary Algorithm
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are a class of search algo-
rithms inspired by Darwin's theory on variation and natural
selection, and are becoming increasingly popular for model-
ing economic behavior, particularly within the ¯eld of agent-
based computational economics (ACE), see e.g. [14]. We
use an implementation based on \evolution strategies" [2],
which is typical for real-valued encoding of the strategies
(whereas the more popular branch of \genetic algorithms"
is originally based on binary encoding).
The EAs are used to produce e®ective bargaining strategies
for the buyer agents. Strategies for the agents of di®erent
buyer types are produced by separate EAs, which operate in
parallel. This allows for heterogeneous strategies to emerge.
Furthermore, in case of an adaptive seller agent, a separate
EA is also used to produce strategies for the seller agent.
A graphical representation of the evolutionary simulation
with two buyer types and an adaptive seller agent is given
in Fig. 2.
Each EA starts with a population of parent strategies, which
are randomly generated. The EA then performs the follow-
ing cycle to improve the quality or ¯tness of the strategies.
First, the reproduction operator generates a population of
o®spring strategies by randomly selecting strategies from
the parent population and slightly mutating the strategy to
obtain variation.
In the next step, the ¯tness of the strategies is determined
by the average utility obtained in a number of bargaining
games. At the start of each bargaining game, the number of
participating buyers of each type is determined randomly us-
ing a Poisson distribution as described above. Buyer agents
are then generated for each buyer and are assigned a ran-
domly selected strategy from either the parent or o®spring
population of the corresponding type. Similarly, a strat-
egy is selected randomly for the seller agent (in case of an
adaptive seller). The bargaining game is played for a ¯xed
number of times, determining the number of buyers and as-
signing new strategies at the start of each game.
In the ¯nal stage of the cycle, a deterministic selection
scheme called (¹ + ¸)-selection chooses the strategies with
the highest ¯tness from both the parents and the o®spring
populations as the new parents for the next generation [2].
The cycle is repeated for a ¯xed number of generations.
3.4.1 Strategy encoding
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the buyer agent's strategy con-
sists of two piece-wise linear functions: an o®er and a thresh-
old function. The functions are encoded using real values,
where each bending point of a function is encoded by two
real values (i.e., the period and the corresponding threshold
value). Additionally, two end points mark the values for the
¯rst and last period. For example, 8 real values are needed
to encode a pair of functions with two line pieces each.
The same representation is used for the seller agent if he
uses a time-based threshold strategy. If a ¯xed threshold is
used, only a single real value is needed to encode this. Note
that the seller agent uses the same function for both the
threshold and for producing o®ers.
3.4.2 Mutation with Exponential Decay
The mutation operator changes the strategy of an agent as
follows. Each real value xi is mutated by adding a zero-
mean Gaussian variable with a standard deviation ¾ [2]:
x
0
i := xi + ¾Ni(0;1). All resulting values larger than unity
(or smaller than zero) are set to unity (respectively zero).
In our simulations, we use a model of exponentially decay-
ing standard deviations. This approach ensures convergence
and is analogous to simulated annealing, where a temper-
ature parameter determines the variation of the solution.
A half-life parameter determines the number of generations
that the mutation standard changes to half the value.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section reports on the settings and the results of the
computational experiments using the bargaining simulation
environment.
4.1 SettingsThe following settings are used for the experiments reported
in this paper (we note that also experiments are carried
out using other settings, e.g. with a di®erent number of
participating buyers and buyer valuations, resulting in very
similar outcomes). Buyers are grouped into three types (k =
3), each type having adaptive bargaining strategies evolving
in separate populations. The time pressure (discount factor)
±i for each type i is set as a control parameter. The values
v1;i and v2;i, and the parameters ®i and ¯i are randomly
generated from a uniform distribution at the beginning of
each experiment, such that v1;i;v2;i 2 [100;300] and ®i;¯i 2
[0:7;0:9]. A buyer furthermore has a minimum threshold
value, which is a minimum acceptable utility and is ¯xed at
10% of the most favourable utility (i.e., the utility ui when
o1 = o2 = 0, see Section 3.2).
The piece-wise linear functions of the buyer agents, and of
the seller agent in case of time-based threshold strategy, con-
sist of two line pieces. The number of buyers of each type
participating in a bargaining game is determined randomly
by a Poisson distribution with the average m = 10. Buy-
ers and sellers produce 3 o®ers in each round, which are
randomly selected given a threshold value. However, when
the seller produces counter o®ers without delay to improve
Pareto e±ciency (see Section 2.4), the seller generates 5 of-
fers in the vicinity of the buyer's best o®ers. The length of
a bargaining game is set to 40 periods.
The EA settings are chosen such that results are robust and
the EAs are able to ¯nd good solutions. All buyer types use
equal settings, with 20 strategies in the parent populations
and 20 o®spring strategies. The mutation standard devi-
ation (see Section 3.4.2) is initially set to 0.2, and decays
with a half-life value of 50 generations. The EA settings
for the seller are the same, except that each seller popula-
tion only contains 10 strategies. Buyers have larger pop-
ulations because more buyers than sellers participate each
game, and because in case of the extended buyer strategy
(with two functions) the search space for the buyer is larger
(a higher population size is often recommended for larger
search spaces). The ¯tness of the strategies for a single gen-
eration is determined by 100 bargaining games. For these
settings the EAs are able to ¯nd almost optimal solutions
for simple test cases.
4.2 Results
The results reported in this Section are obtained after a
process of learning, when the strategies have converged. It
is important to note that, during learning, the preferences
of the buyers remain unchanged, although the number and
composition (i.e., number of each type) of buyers can di®er
in each bargaining game. Experiments are run for 40000
bargaining games (400 generations). Results are averaged
over the last 1000 bargaining games of an experiment, and
over 30 experiments, accounting for random settings such as
the number of participating buyers and the buyer's prefer-
ences.
Figure 3 compares the obtained fraction of the total seller
surplus for di®erent seller threshold strategies and buyer dis-
count factors (buyers have equal discount factors). We de-
¯ne the seller surplus of a bilateral negotiation as the seller's
maximum feasible utility, i.e., when the buyer o®ers her min-
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Figure 3: Seller's obtained fraction of total surplus
for various discount factors and using 5 di®erent
threshold strategies: (1) ¯xed threshold, (2) time-
dependent threshold, (3) responsive threshold, (4)
combined (3) and (1), and (5) combined (3) and (2).
The discount factor is set equal for all buyers.
imum threshold value and the o®er is Pareto-e±cient. As
shown in Fig. 3, the ¯xed threshold strategy (1) is able to
extract around 75% of the seller surplus. Note that the
outcomes are independent of the discount factor when this
strategy is used. Clearly, the ¯xed threshold strategy is un-
able to bene¯t from the buyers' time pressure.
The time-based threshold strategy (2), on the other hand,
shows that higher pro¯ts can be obtained if the threshold
changes in time, see Fig. 3. Buyers with a high valuation will
purchase relatively early, since waiting for a better deal does
not compensate the loss due to time discounting. Buyers
with a low valuation, on the other hand, have the incentive
to reach an agreement in a later stage if they can get a better
price for it. This way the seller can indirectly discriminate
between buyers with di®erent valuations and time pressures.
Note that with no time discounting (i.e., when ± = 1) the
¯xed threshold strategy performs better. This is due to the
di®erence in strategy complexity: only a single value needs
to be optimized in case of a ¯xed threshold, whereas an en-
tire function (encoded by 4 values) needs to be learned in
case of the time-based threshold. This is clearly more di±-
cult, especially within a dynamic environment with learning
buyers.
Outcomes using the responsive threshold bargaining strate-
gies (see Fig. 3 (3),(4), and (5)) show an impressive increase
in the fraction of surplus when buyers are impatient. If the
time pressure becomes su±ciently high, the seller obtains
almost the entire surplus. Even for lower time pressure, re-
sults are much better for the seller compared to the ¯xed and
time-based threshold strategies. For the case of no or very
low time pressure, the results also show that simple auction-
like mechanisms such as the responsive threshold strategy
are not su±cient in case of unlimited supply. Without com-
petition between buyers, the market price goes to cost level,
resulting in a zero surplus for the seller. This problem can be
resolved in bargaining by combining the responsive thresh-
old strategy with an adaptive reservation value. As shownStrategy ±1 ±2 ±3 fraction seller surplus
1 1:0 0:95 0:90 0:75 § 0:09
2 1:0 0:95 0:90 0:76 § 0:12
3 1:0 0:95 0:90 0:55 § 0:08
4 1:0 0:95 0:90 0:86 § 0:09
5 1:0 0:95 0:90 0:84 § 0:08
1 0:95 0:90 0:85 0:75 § 0:09
2 0:95 0:90 0:85 0:85 § 0:08
3 0:95 0:90 0:85 0:86 § 0:07
4 0:95 0:90 0:85 0:95 § 0:04
5 0:95 0:90 0:85 0:95 § 0:04
Table 1: Mean fraction of seller surplus when the
3 buyer types have di®erent discount factors. The
strategies correspond to the seller threshold strate-
gies in Fig. 3.
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Figure 4: Average ine±ciency of the agreements us-
ing di®erent strategies. The numbers correspond to
the seller threshold strategies in Fig. 3.
in Fig. 3, this results in very good outcomes, even if buyers
are very patient. This makes the combined strategy very
versatile.
The above outcomes are based on experiments where buyers
have equal time pressure. The results shown in Table 1, how-
ever, indicate a similar outcome if di®erent buyer types have
di®erent time preferences. Table 1 shows the mean fraction
of surplus obtained by the seller given a discount factor ±i
for buyers of type i, using the di®erent threshold strategies.
These outcomes in Table 1 also show that the responsive
threshold strategy (no. 3) performs relatively poorly even
if only one of the buyer types has no time pressure (in this
case when ±1 = 1:0). This occurs since very little pro¯ts are
obtained from these buyers. As before, however, low pro¯ts
can be prevented by adding a reservation value.
The mean (in)e±ciency of the obtained bargaining results is
depicted in Fig. 4. The ine±ciency is measured as the seller's
maximum Pareto-improvement of a given outcome divided
by the seller's actual utility plus the improvement. The out-
comes show low ine±ciencies for all strategies (the highest
ine±ciency is around 2.7% of the total utility). However,
relatively the responsive threshold strategies result in the
most Pareto-e±cient deals. Unlike the other strategies, the
responsive strategies set the threshold exactly to the best
o®er. Since this is the buyer's best o®er, it is already quite
e±cient. In case of the other strategies, however, the util-
ity of the o®ers usually exceed the seller's threshold, and the
seller ¯rst needs to map the buyer's o®ers to the right utility
level when making counter o®ers. This mapping results in
additional ine±ciencies of the outcomes. Even with a rea-
sonably simple strategy for determining the relative magni-
tude of the attribute values, already good results are found.
The Pareto-e±ciency is expected to improve even further
by incorporating more advanced strategies as described in
e.g. [5, 9, 4, 10, 13]. This is however left for future work.
4.3 Bargaining Revisited
A possible strategy of the buyer agent is to bid very low, and
then accept the counter o®er of the seller. Such a strategy
could be bene¯cial in case the seller's counter o®er is in°u-
enced by the buyers' o®ers, as with the responsive thresh-
old strategies. This could then result in low pro¯ts for the
seller. To see if indeed buyers bene¯t from such a strategy,
the strategy representation for buyers was extended by us-
ing two separate functions: one produces the threshold for
determining the utility level of the o®ers and the other func-
tion determines the threshold for accepting or rejecting the
seller's o®ers (see Section 3.2). Even with separated func-
tion, however, the responsive threshold strategy performs
very much in favor of the seller (as shown by the results).
This occurs because the counter o®er is delayed by the seller
whenever o®ers fall below the (seller's) threshold, hence pro-
viding the buyers with an incentive to try and get an agree-
ment without delay.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we consider strategies for a seller agent who
negotiates with many buyers simultaneously in a bilat-
eral fashion over multiple interdependent attributes. These
strategies respect a notion of fairness such that buyers are
treated similarly. An important aspect of the developed
strategies is their ability to bene¯t from impatient buyers
that prefer early agreements. Buyers can have di®erent val-
uations and time preferences. A buyer's actual valuation
and time preference is only known to himself (i.e., a buyer's
type constitutes private information).
The strategies introduced determine three aspects: a thresh-
old, multi-attribute o®ers with a utility level corresponding
to the threshold, and a scheme for determining when to re-
spond. Five di®erent threshold strategies for the seller agent
are evaluated and compared: (1) ¯xed threshold, (2) time-
dependent threshold strategies, (3) responsive, (4) respon-
sive with ¯xed reservation value, and (5) responsive with
time-dependent reservation value. The last two strategies
are actually a combination of the responsive threshold strat-
egy with the ¯rst two strategies.
We use an evolutionary simulation to analyze the perfor-
mance of the di®erent strategies when the buyers and seller
bargain over two interdependent attributes. The buyers bar-
gaining strategies adapt and learn through the use of an
evolutionary algorithm (EA). The seller's strategies (1) and
(2), and the combined strategies (4) and (5) also adapt and
learn using an EA. The responsive threshold strategy (3),
on the other hand, determines the threshold value based ex-clusively on the o®ers received by the buyers, and does not
require any learning.
The outcomes show that bilaterally exchanging multiple of-
fers combined with a random o®er generation mechanism
su±ces for closely approximating Pareto-e±ciency. Further-
more, the responsive threshold strategies appear to be very
successful in utilizing time pressure and consequently ex-
tract a very high share of the surplus. For su±ciently high
time pressure, the seller obtains almost all surplus, indicat-
ing that buyers submit and/or accept o®ers close to their
reservation value. Thus buyers self-select to pay their val-
uation, while the bargaining outcomes respect our notion
of fairness. The results also show superior performance of
the combined strategies (4 and 5) compared to the auction-
inspired strategy (3), in case some or all buyers have very
little time pressure. In other words, the combined strategy
is very versatile.
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